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Abstract
Some concepts associated with the notion of public consumption
could be considered as wasteful public expenditures, so that a first-
best analysis would set their level equal to zero every period. How-
ever, their ratio to output is significant and rather stable over time
in actual economies. In an endogenous growth framework similar to
Barro (1990), we analytically characterize the dependence of a second-
best public investment policy on wasteful public consumption. We
compare two extreme tax systems: a distorting system and a non-
distorting one. The presence of wasteful expenditures affect optimal
public investment and the optimal public financing mechanism. Since
private agents do not internalize the fact that by raising their capital
accumulation they could be generating extra public investment and
consumption, financing public expenditures through lump-sum taxes
might lead to an excessive crowding-out impact on current consump-
tion, which may sharply reduce welfare in the short-run as well as
limit public capital accumulation and long-run growth. It turns out
that this effect can be more damaging for growth and welfare than
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the disincentive created on private capital accumulation when taxing
capital income.
Keywords: Endogenous growth, distorting taxes, public invest-
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1 Introduction
Analyzing the implications of fiscal policy for growth and welfare is central
to optimal economic policy design. In dynamic settings, we can consider
four main branches of research: i) characterizing the impact on growth and
welfare of a second-best tax structure, along the lines of the seminal paper
by Ramsey (1927) [Chamley (1986), Judd (1985), Lucas (1991), etc.],1 ii)
analyzing the influence of public investment on growth and welfare, along
the lines of Barro (1990) [Futagami et al. (1993), Glomm and Ravikumar
(1994), Turnovsky (1996, 2000), etc.]2 iii) reexamining the idea proposed by
Barro (1979) that taxes should follow a smooth process, regardless of the
stochastic process followed by government expenditures [Lucas and Stockey
(1983), Hansen et al. (1991), etc.], and iv) focusing on fiscal policy as a
potential major source of macroeconomic fluctuations [Barro (1981), Baxter
and King (1993), etc.].
Somewhat surprisingly, however, not much work has been done regarding
the optimal simultaneous choice of a public investment and a financing rule.
Some exceptions are Corsetti and Roubini (1996) in a two-sector endogenous
growth setting and Fisher and Turnovsky (1998) in a neoclassical growth
model, among others. In the former, public expenditures are assumed to
exert a positive external effect on physical capital while, in the latter, private
capital over-congests public capital in competitive equilibrium.3 In these
analyses, private capital is over-accumulated at the competitive equilibrium
allocation, so it will generally be desirable that a government should abate
this over-accumulation by taxing capital rents.4 We aim to do some progress
1These pioneer works by Judd (1985), Chamley (1986) and Lucas (1990) emphasized
the negative incidence of capital income taxes on welfare in general equilibrium models.
Judd (1999) also argued for a zero tax rate on physical and human capital income in the
long-run. In these economies, the public sector is assumed to finance a constant stream
of wasteful government spending, and in general raising revenues through taxing factors’
rents is baneful for welfare. However, this result clearly depends upon the chance the
government has to use alternative financing instruments.
2Empirical work by Ratner (1983), Aschauer (1989) and Munnell (1990) emphasizes
the positive link between public expenses and the private production process, among many
others.
3In a model without public capital, Chamley (2001) shows that borrowing constraints
may induce individuals to over-accumulate capital in the long-run when insuring against
idiosyncratic shocks.
4An alternative well-known argument in favor of taxing in a distorting fashion arises
from distributive considerations. Generally, the positive effect of income distribution be-
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along this line, by characterizing an optimal policy of taxing the income
earned by physical capital as a production factor.
A broad classification of public expenditures would distinguish between
productive and non-productive concepts. Roughly, public investment could
be considered as the productive type of public expenditures [Barro (1990)].
Among the non-productive concepts, there exists those that could be con-
sidered wasteful public expenditures, like bureaucratic and administrative
costs, the payment of interest on outstanding debt, etc., which we could as-
sociate with the notion of public consumption. In the absence of frictions or
constraints, a first-best analysis of optimal policy would suggest setting this
type of expenditures equal to zero every period. However, what we observe
in real economies is that, as a percentage of output, public consumption is
far from zero and has remained fairly constant over the last decades.5 This
suggests the presence of some restrictions in real economies that lead into a
second-best choice of public investment and consumption, as well as of their
appropriate financing scheme. This is in line with Jones et al. (1997) and
Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998), who pointed out that certain public rev-
enue constraints could imply that taxing productive factors positively in the
long-run might be optimal in a second-best sense.
Our aim is precisely to characterize the effect of wasteful public expendi-
tures on the optimal public investment policy, as well as on the appropriate
financing mechanism for total public expenditures in an endogenous growth
framework similar to Barro (1990). In that setting, a) we assume that pub-
lic and private capital enter the private production process; b) two types
of public expenses are considered: public investment, which affects produc-
tion through the stock of public capital available every period, and public
consumption, which does not directly affect utility or production, thereby be-
ing some kind of wasteful public expenditure; c) along the balanced growth
tween generations makes a zero tax rate on capital income not to be optimal: see Jones
and Manuelli (1992) in an overlapping generations setting with production, and Caballé
(1998) in an infinitely-lived framework with altruistic preferences.
5On average and along the period 1970-88 and for a large set of countries, Easterly
and Rebelo (1994), pp. 36, show that, as a percentage of GDP, the Current Government
Expenditure was 23,4%, the Gross Fixed Capital Formation 3,3% and the Capital Expen-
diture 5,8%. In addition, they show that the standard deviation of the gross fixed capital
formation and capital expenditure is almost the same as their means, while it is less than
halved for current expenditure. This fact leads us to think that in real economies the
path of several concepts of public expenditures are painless to be altered than others (i.e.,
public investment or expenditure in R&D).
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path, public consumption grows at the same rate than output, and it must
be financed every period;6 d) the same taxing scheme finances both types of
public expenditures, while issuing debt is forbidden. Additional assumptions
will be introduced transforming our setup into a version of the AK model,
which will allow us to solve analytically for the competitive equilibrium.
We analytically characterize the welfare-maximizing public investment/output
ratio under two alternative and extreme tax scenarios. These are, for the
sake of simplicity, those considered in Fisher and Turnovsky (1998): 1) a
distortionary tax on total income (referred to as the distorting tax system
hereinafter) and 2) a lump-sum tax (the non-distorting tax system), in both
cases with a period-by-period balanced budget. Then, we compute and com-
pare the maximum growth rates and welfare levels achieved under both tax
systems. It turns out that the existence of a wasteful component in pub-
lic expenditures not only affects the optimal public investment policy, but
it could also alter dramatically the way how public expenditures should be
financed. Indeed, we show that raising revenues through distorting taxation
might be a preferred strategy to raising revenues through lump-sum taxa-
tion, this result not relying upon the type of externalities described above
(borrowing constraints, congestion effects of public capital,...). This result
is more likely to arise in economies with high levels of the wasteful public
expenditure/output ratio, high values of the elasticities of private and public
capital in the private production process and/or a high preference for future
utility.
The intuition behind our result is as follows: In a Barro-type setting, a
tax increase can be used to finance a higher level of public investment, which
has a direct and positive impact on growth and welfare. If the source of rev-
enues is income taxes, private capital accumulation will be discouraged, and
the positive effect on growth and welfare of the increase in productive public
expenditures is partly neutralized. On the other hand, even though lump-
sum tax financing is not harmful for private capital accumulation, private
consumption will be strongly affected immediately, since it will experience
most of the implied crowding-out impact. That way, choosing between dis-
torting and non-distorting taxes represents a trade-off between current and
future consumption. Discouraging private capital accumulation, distorting
taxes have a long-run effect on future growth and consumption. Alterna-
6Since our economy shows ongoing endogenous growth, it has no sense to assume a
contant stream of wasteful expenditure.
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tively, taxing lump-sum has a strong short-run effect on consumption, with
no disincentive on private capital accumulation. Which tax system is pre-
ferred will depend on the relative size of both effects on welfare.
Since private agents do not internalize the fact that by increasing out-
put through their private capital accumulation decisions they contribute to
generating higher public investment and consumption, the true social cost
of this additional output is not being taken into account. Consequently,
financing total public expenditures through lump-sum taxes leads to an ex-
tra crowding-out impact on current consumption, which may sharply reduce
initial welfare and also the growth stimulus achievable through public invest-
ment. It turns out that this effect can be more damaging for growth and
welfare than the disincentive created on private capital accumulation when
taxing capital income.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the basic framework
is described. In section 3 the competitive equilibrium and the long-run
equilibrium path are characterized. In sections 4 the growth- and welfare-
maximizing public investment policies under income and lump-sum taxes are
compared, and a simple numerical example is presented. Finally, section 5
ends with main conclusions and extensions.
2 A basic framework for analysis
The model draws on work by Barro (1990), Futagami et al. (1993) and
Glomm and Ravikumar (1994). It differs from the non-congested version in
the Glomm-Ravikumar setting because of the presence of an spillover factor
in production and the fact that not all public expenditure is productive. The
economy consists of a continuum of identical firms, a fiscal authority and a
representative household.
2.1 Firms
Firms are identical, rent the same amount of physical capital kt and labor lt
from households, and produce yt units of the consumption commodity at a
given period t. The capital stock used in the aggregate by all firms, Kt, is
taken as a proxy for the index of knowledge available to each single firm [as in
Romer (1986)]. Additionally, public capital, Kgt , is exogenous to the private
production process and affects all individual firms in the same way. Except
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for these externalities, the private production technology can be represented
by a standard Cobb-Douglas function presenting constant returns to scale.
Assumption 1: Private and public capital are essential in the private
production process.
The technology available to any firm can be represented,
yt = f(lt, kt,Kt,K
g
t ) = Al
1−α
t k
α
t K
φ
t (K
g
t )
θ , α, θ ∈ (0, 1), φ ∈ [0, 1], (1)
where α is the share of private capital in output, θ and φ are the constant
elasticities of output with respect to public capital and the knowledge index,
and A is a technological scale. Since all firms are identical, we can aggregate
on (1) to obtain total output in the economy, Yt,
Yt = AL
1−α
t K
(α+φ+θ)
t
µ
Kgt
Kt
¶θ
, (2)
where Lt, Kt are the total amounts of labor and physical capital used by all
the firms in the economy. We focus on the special case in which cumulative
factors show constant returns to scale. As it is well known [see Barro (1990)
and Rebelo (1991), among many others], this is a necessary condition for
endogenous growth to arise in a Barro-type setting:7
Assumption 2: α+ φ+ θ = 1.
During period t, each firm faces competitive markets for the production
factors, were the wage wt and the real interest rate rt are determined. The
profit maximizing problem of the typical firm turns out to be static,
Max
{lt,kt}
f(lt, kt,Kt, K
g
t )− wtlt − rtkt,
leading to the usual marginal product conditions,
rt = f
0
kt = αAl
1−α
t k
α−1
t K
φ
t (K
g
t )
θ = α
yt
kt
= α
Yt
Kt
, (3)
wt = f
0
lt = (1− α)Al
−α
t k
α
t K
φ
t (K
g
t )
θ = (1− α)yt
lt
= (1− α)Yt
Lt
, (4)
7Even though the presence of the spillover factor in the aggregate technology is not
needed for our results, it allows us to: i) change the values of the α, θ parameters indepen-
dently from each other when conducting a sensitive analysis; ii) pick standard values for
α and θ out in a calibration excercise (0,36 and 0,20, respectively), by setting φ = 0, 44.
However, considering a broad definition of private capital might allow α to be well above
0,36, and the spillover effect would not be necessary.
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where we have used the fact that each firm treats its own contribution to the
aggregate capital stock as given. Under (3)-(4), every firm gets zero profits
and we have the standard result on income distribution,
rtKt + wtLt = Yt. (5)
2.2 The public sector
The public sector collects taxes to finance its expenditures.
Assumption 3: Two types of public expenditures are considered: public
investment, Igt , and public services, C
g
t , the latter having no incidence on the
production technology or the preferences of the representative consumer.
As in Barro (1990), public investment is assumed to be a constant and
positive fraction, κi, of total output every period,8
Igt = κiYt, κi ≥ 0. (6)
Public capital accumulates according to,
Kgt+1 = I
g
t + (1− δg)Kgt . (7)
On the other hand, we consider the following exogenous process for Cgt .
Cgt = C
g
0
¡
1 + γg
¢t
, Cg0 , γg ≥ 0, (8)
where Cg0 is the initial level of wasteful public expenditures and γg is its
constant growth rate.9 Under Assumption 2, total output will grow at a
constant rate, γy, in the long-run. γg can never be bigger than γy, since that
would make the ratio Cgt /Yt raise without any bound. On the other hand, if
γg < γy the ratio C
g
t /Yt would go to zero, preventing us from analyzing the
long-run limitations that wasteful public expenditures impose on the choice
of optimal fiscal policy. Hence, we assume that γg = γy.
Assumption 4: The wasteful component of public expenditures grows
every period at the long-run growth rate of output.
8According to Easterly and Rebelo (1994), the total consolidated public invest-
ment/output ratio (public enterprise and general government investment) was 9,17% (con-
sidering the decade averages - 1960’s, 70’s and 80’s - for their cross-section set of countries).
9Since our economy will show an ongoing growth process, it has no sense to assume a
constant path for Cgt .
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Remark 1 Under Assumption 4, Cgt /Yt will converge to a constant ratio
κc > 0. If we add the assumption that public and private capital fully de-
preciate every period, our economy is just a version of the AK-model, not
displaying any transitional dynamics, so
Cgt = κcYt, for all t ≥ 0. (9)
Remark 2 From (6) and (9), public expenditure is bounded above for any
period t,
Cgt + I
g
t ≤ (Cg0 + I
g
0 )
¡
1 + γy
¢t
. (10)
Assumption 5: Tax revenues finance total public expenditures every
period.
Two alternative tax scenarios are considered [as in Fisher and Turnovsky
(1998)]: i) a distorting taxation scheme, where total income is taxed at a
rate τ t while transfers, Xt, are zero, with a government budget constraint,
Igt + C
g
t = τ tYt, (11)
and ii) a non-distorting tax scenario, with τ t = 0, and the government fi-
nancing its expenditures through lump-sum taxes,
Igt + C
g
t = Xt. (12)
2.3 Households
We assume zero population growth and normalize population size to one.
The representative consumer is the owner of physical capital, and allocates
her resources between consumption, Ct, and investment in physical capital,
It. Private physical capital accumulates over time according to,
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt, (13)
and decisions are made each period to maximize the discounted aggregate
value of the time separable, logarithmic utility function
Max
{Ct,Kt+1}∞t=0
∞X
t=0
βt ln(Ct), (14)
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subject to the budget constraint,
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt ≤ (1− τ t)(wtLt + rtKt), (15)
under income taxes and
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +Xt ≤ wtLt + rtKt, (16)
under lump-sum taxes. Kt+1 denotes the stock of physical capital at the end
of time t, with K0 > 0, and β is the discount factor, between zero and one.
The consumer takes fiscal policy and factor prices as given when deciding
how to split her current income between consumption and savings. When the
government finances its operations through income taxes, the Euler condition
for the consumer is
Ct+1
Ct
= β [(1− δ) + (1− τ t+1)rt+1] , (17)
while it is
Ct+1
Ct
= β [(1− δ) + rt+1] (18)
in the case of lump-sum taxation. Under both tax systems, the transversality
condition is
lim
t→∞
βtKt+1
∂U
∂Ct
≡ lim
t→∞
βtKt+1
1
Ct
= 0, (19)
and Kt+1 ≥ 0, Ct ≥ 0, for any period t. The Euler conditions and the
transversality condition are jointly sufficient for consumer optimization.
3 Equilibrium conditions and the balanced
growth path
3.1 The competitive equilibrium
Aparticular fiscal policy π is characterized by a sequence of π ≡ {Igt , Cgt , τ t,Xt}∞t=0.
Following Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), we define a π-competitive equilib-
rium (π-CE):
Definition 1 Given initial conditions K0, K
g
0 > 0, a π-CE for the overall
economy is a set of allocations
©
Ct, Kt+1, K
g
t+1, It, Lt, Yt
ª∞
t=0
, a set of prices
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{rt, wt}∞t=0 and a fiscal policy π, such that, given {rt, wt}∞t=0: (i) {Lt,Kt+1}∞t=0
solve the profit maximizing problem of firms [i.e., (3)-(4) hold], (ii) {Ct, Kt+1}∞t=0
maximize the utility of households [i.e., (19), Ct, Kt+1 ≥ 0 and either (15)
and (17) under income taxes or (16) and (18) under lump-sum taxes hold],
(iii) the public sector budget constraint [either (11) or (12)], together with
(6), (9) and the technology constraints (2), (13), (7) hold and (iv) markets
clear every period:
Lt = 1, (20)
Yt = Ct + C
g
t + It + I
g
t . (21)
In fact, the condition that marginal utility at the origin is equal to infinity
will guarantee that strict inequalities will hold for Kt+1 > 0, Ct > 0 at all
time periods, which we use in what follows.
3.2 The balanced growth path
The balanced growth path (bgp) is a π-CE trajectory along which aggregate
variables grow at a zero or positive constant rate. Barro (1990), Rebelo
(1991) and Jones and Manuelli (1997), among many others, have shown that
Assumption 2 and the fact that rt must be constant and sufficiently high,
are necessary and sufficient conditions for the equilibrium to display positive
and steady growth in our Barro-type setting.
Under these conditions, it is easy to show from the equilibrium conditions
that Yt, Ct, Kt, K
g
t , C
g
t and Xt must all grow at the same constant rate,
denoted γ¯ hereinafter, along the bgp while bounded variables, such as τ t and
rt, must remain constant. Therefore, the ratios ct = Ct/Kt, k
g
t = K
g
t /Kt,
yt = Yt/Kt, c
g
t = C
g
t /Kt and xt = Xt/Kt are constant along the bgp.
In terms of these ratios, π-CE conditions can be particularized for a bgp
equilibrium to the following system in γ¯, c¯, k¯g, y¯, r¯, c¯g, x¯ and τ¯ (letters with
bar refer to values along the bgp):
γ¯ + δ = (1− κi − κc)y¯ − c¯, (22)
γ¯ + δg = κiy¯(k¯g)−1, (23)
r¯ = αy¯, (24)
y¯ = A(k¯g)θ, (25)
c¯g = κcy¯, (26)
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and either
x¯ = 0, (27)
τ¯ = κi + κc, (28)
1 + γ¯ = β [(1− δ) + (1− τ¯) r] , (29)
under income taxes, or
τ¯ = 0, (30)
x¯ = (κi + κc)y¯, (31)
1 + γ¯ = β(1− δ + r¯), (32)
under lump-sum taxes.
Condition (22) comes from the global constraint of resources, (23) is the
public investment rule, (24) is the gross return on capital accumulation,
(25) is the production function, (26) is the public consumption rule and,
depending on the tax system considered, either (29) or (32) refer to the
intertemporal substitution of consumption relationship and either (28) or
(31) is the government budget constraint.
In parallel to Definition 1, for a particular stationary fiscal policy π¯ =
{κi,κc, τ¯ , x¯}, the π¯-balanced growth path (π¯-bgp) is defined:
Definition 2 A π¯-bgp is a vector Π¯ = {γ¯, c¯, k¯g, y¯, r¯, c¯g} and a stationary
fiscal policy π¯ satisfying: (22)-(26), either (27)-(29) under income taxes or
(30)-(32) under lump-sum taxes, the transversality condition (19) and non-
negativity conditions c¯ > 0 and k¯g > 0.
The common growth rate property allows us to write the bgp version of
the transversality condition (19) as, limt→∞ β
t (1 + γ¯) 1
c
= 0, which will be
satisfied by any π¯-bgp.
3.3 The full depreciation π¯-bgp
Assumption 5: Both types of capital fully depreciate each period: δ =
δg = 1.
Assumption 5 enables us to obtain an analytical characterization of the
π-CE and the π¯-bgp allocations, so that our results can be easily compared
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with those obtained in previous research.10 Proposition 3 shows the existence
of a single π¯-bgp under δ = δg = 1,11 provided that κi and κc are such that
a positive amount of resources is left to the consumer every period.12
Proposition 3 If κi + κc < 1, there is a single π¯-bgp under income taxes.
Under lump-sum taxes κi + κc < 1 − αβ is required for a π¯-bgp to exist.
Then, the π¯-bgp is also unique.
Proof. (i) Under income taxes, if κi + κc < 1, the set of equations (22)-
(29), particularized to the case of full depreciation, has a single solution,
k¯gd =
κi
αβ(1− κi − κc)
, (33)
r¯d = Aα1−θ
·
κi
β(1− κi − κc)
¸θ
, (34)
γ¯d = Aκθi [αβ(1− κi − κc)]
1−θ − 1, (35)
yd = A
·
κi
αβ(1− κi − κc)
¸θ
, (36)
c¯d = (1− κi − κc)1−θ(1− αβ)A
µ
κi
αβ
¶θ
, (37)
c¯gd = κcA
·
κi
αβ(1− κi − κc)
¸θ
. (38)
Since αβ < 1, it is clear that c¯d, k¯gd > 0, so the vector Π¯d = {γ¯d, c¯d, k¯gd, y¯d, r¯d, c¯gd}
defined by (33)-(38), will be a π¯-bgp.
(ii) Similarly, under lump-sum taxes, combining (22)-(26) with (30)-(32)
leads to,
k¯gn =
κi
αβ
, (39)
10Together with the assumption that leisure does not enter in the utility function, which
is of the logarithmic type. In section 4, full depreciation is shown not to be crucial for
the conclusions relating to the growth-maximizing public expenditures policies, although
it may be relevant for welfare analysis.
11In the Appendix (part 1), we show this statement for any δ, δg ∈ [0, 1].
12Hereinafter, a d-uppercase denotes a variable under distortionary taxation, while an
n-uppercase denotes the value of the variable under non-distortionary taxes.
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r¯n = Aα1−θ
µ
κi
β
¶θ
, (40)
γ¯n = Aκθi (αβ)
1−θ − 1, (41)
yn = A
µ
κi
αβ
¶θ
, (42)
c¯n = A
µ
κi
αβ
¶θ
[(1− κi − κc)− αβ] , (43)
c¯gn = κcA
µ
κi
αβ
¶θ
. (44)
Furthermore, c¯n, k¯gn > 0 so long as κi + κc < 1 − αβ. Under that condi-
tion, the vector Π¯n = {γ¯n, c¯n, k¯gn, y¯n, c¯gn, r¯n}, which is uniquely defined by
conditions (39)-(44) above, will be a π¯-bgp
3.4 Characterizing the full depreciation π-CE
The simplicity of the model allows for the π-CE to be analytically charac-
terized. If we take a linear guess for the dependence of the decision rules for
Ct and Kt+1 on output: Ct = aYt and Kt+1 = bYt to: (15), (17), (11), (6),
(9), (3), together with Lt = 1, we get under income taxes,
Cdt = [(1− αβ) (1− κi − κc)]A
³
Kgdt
´θ ¡
Kdt
¢1−θ
, t = 0, 1, 2, ...,(45)
Kdt+1 = αβ (1− κi − κc)A
³
Kgdt
´θ ¡
Kdt
¢1−θ
, t = 0, 1, 2, ..., (46)
while taking to (16), (18), (12), (6), (9) (3) the proposed linear rules for
capital and consumption, together with Lt = 1, we obtain under lump-sum
taxes,
Cnt = [(1− κi − κc)− αβ]A (K
g
t )
θ (Knt )
1−θ , t = 0, 1, 2, ..., (47)
Knt+1 = αβA (K
gn
t )
θ (Knt )
1−θ , t = 0, 1, 2, ... (48)
Finally, under both tax systems, combining (2), (6) and Lt = 1, we get
Kgt+1 = κiA (K
g
t )
θK1−θt , t = 0, 1, 2, ... (49)
14
which is, under either tax system, a set of three equations characterizing the
law of motion for Ct, Kt+1 and K
g
t+1 along a π-CE. Indeed, we show in part
1 in the Appendix that, given K0, K
g
0 > 0 and a fiscal policy π, the sequence©
Cdt ,K
d
t+1
ª∞
t=0
under distorting taxes and the sequence
©
Cnt ,K
n
t+1
ª∞
t=0
under
non-distorting taxes are the unique π-competitive equilibrium allocation.13
The dynamic properties of the model are basically those of the standard
AK-model. In particular, the time evolution of Ct, Kt+1 and K
g
t+1, is charac-
terized by the eigenvalue structure of the coefficient matrix of the state-space
representation of the system above, in logs. Under either tax system, that
representation is [cˆ = ln(C), kˆ = ln(K), kˆg = ln(Kg)],
cˆt = d1 + θkˆ
g
t + (1− θ) kˆt,µ
kˆgt+1
kˆt+1
¶
=
µ
d2
d3
¶
+
µ
θ 1− θ
θ 1− θ
¶µ
kˆgt
kˆt
¶
,
where d1, d2 and d3 are constants. Independently of the tax system, this
transition matrix has a zero eigenvalue and a second eigenvalue equal to one.
The zero eigenvalue reflects the absence of transitional dynamics, while the
unit eigenvalue is inherent to sustained growth models,14 implying that the
ratios Kgt /Kt, Ct/Kt converge to constant levels, k¯
g and c¯.
Since the competitive equilibrium is unique, givenK0, K
g
0 > 0 and a fiscal
policy π, the previous system provides us with the values of C0, K1 and K
g
1
under either tax policy, the three variables growing from that time on at the
common rate γ¯ given by (35) and (41).
4 Income versus lump-sum taxes
In this section we discuss the possibility that the steady-state growth rate
as well as the level of welfare might be higher under income than under
lump-sum taxes when the government chooses the public investment/output
ratio, κi, to maximize either growth or welfare, respectively. The government
is assumed to be constrained by the need to finance a fixed ratio of public
consumption to output, κc ≥ 0 every period. From Proposition 3, we already
know that any κc < 1 is feasible under income taxes, while κc < 1 − αβ is
13The proof proceeds in a similar way to the argument in Glomm and Ravikumar
(1994,1999).
14See King and Rebelo (1988) and Caballé and Santos (1993).
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the feasibility condition under lump-sum taxes. Hence, we just consider
parameterizations in
Ω ≡
©
ω = (κc,α, β, θ) ∈ <4 : α,β, θ ∈ (0, 1), α+ θ ≤ 1, κc ∈ [0, 1− αβ)
ª
.
4.1 Maximizing steady-state growth
In an economy without transitional dynamics, welfare is determined by the
growth-rate and the initial consumption level, so the influence of the steady-
state growth rate on welfare is obvious. We characterize in this section
conditions under which a given tax system produces higher growth, leaving
the discussion on the implied welfare levels for the next section. From (35),
given a value of κc, γ¯ is strictly concave in κi, with an interior maximum at
κd∗i = θ(1− κc), (50)
which gives us the growth-maximizing level15 of κi under income taxes.16
Condition (50) includes as special cases the result in section I in Barro (1990),
Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) and Futagami et al. (1993), who obtain κd∗i =
θ when working with κc = 0.
Under lump-sum taxes, (41) shows that the steady-state growth rate γ¯ is
monotonically increasing and concave in κi, the level of κi being bounded
from above by
κn∗i = 1− κc − αβ. (51)
This upper bound on κi, which is inversely related to κc, α and β, restricts
the choice set of the government under lump-sum taxes.
Comparing (35) with (41), we see that the growth rate γ¯ will be strictly
higher under lump-sum than under income taxes for a common value of κi,as
shown in Figure 4.1. This is due to the disincentive effect that a positive cap-
ital tax rate exerts on the accumulation of private capital, relative to taxing
lump-sum, when financing a given level of κi + κc. However, a government
interested in maximizing long-run growth would choose a productive public
investment ratio κd∗i under income taxes, choosing an investment ratio as
close as possible to κn∗i under lump-sum taxes. As shown in Figure 4.1, κd∗i
needs to be sufficiently higher than κn∗i for maximum long-run growth to be
15Along the paper, an asterisk denotes a value obtained under a growth-maximizing
public investment strategy.
16Condition (50) is equivalent to that in section IV of Barro (1990).
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higher under distortionary taxation. But both optimal choices, κd∗i and κn∗i
depend on the value of the exogenous ratio κc, to which we turn now.
Plugging (50), (51) in (35), (41), the implied growth rates, denoted by
γ¯d∗ and γ¯n∗, respectively, satisfy
γ¯d∗ > γ¯n∗ ⇔ Ψ(ω) ≡ 1− βα
(1− κc)
n
1− θ [(1− κc)(1− θ)]
1−θ
θ
o < 0, (52)
with Ψ(ω) a function defined over Ω. For any given values of α, β, θ in Ω,
Proposition 4 guarantees the existence of a single and positive level of κc,
denoted by κγc , for which Ψ (κγc ,α, β, θ) = 0 and γ¯d∗ = γ¯n∗. Values of κc
above κγc will significantly reduce the government’s choice set for κi under
lump-sum taxes so that κn∗i will fall to the left of A in Figure 4.1, making γ¯d∗
to be higher than γ¯n∗.17 Above κγc , the value of κc places an upper bound on
the choice of productive public investment under lump-sum taxes, which is
more damaging for growth than the distortion introduced by income taxes.
Finally, Corollary 5 shows that κγc is inversely related to α, β and θ.
Therefore, in a Barro-type setting, it is more likely that the maximum achiev-
able growth rate will be higher under income than under lump-sum taxes in
economies with high values of the unproductive public consumption/output
ratio, high private and public capital productivity (high α and θ) and where
households weight heavily future consumption.
Proposition 4 There is a critical value of κc, 1− αβ1−θ < κγc < 1−αβ, above
(below) which the maximum achievable growth rate is higher (lower) under
income than under lump-sum taxes.
Proof. From the expression of Ψ(ω) in (52), it is easy to check that: (a)
Ψ(ω) is continuous on Ω; (b) for any given values of α,β, θ, Ψ
¡
κc = 1− αβ1−θ ,α,β, θ
¢
=
1 − 1−θµ
1−θ(αβ)
1−θ
θ
¶ > 0, while lim
κc→(1−αβ)−
Ψ(ω) = 1 − 1
1−θ[αβ(1−θ)]
1−θ
θ
< 0; and
(c) ∂Ψ(ω)/∂κc = −βα 1−θ(1−κc)2
1−[(1−κc)(1−θ)]
1−θ
θ½
1−θ[(1−κc)(1−θ)]
1−θ
θ
¾ < 0 on Ω. Therefore, there
exists a single level of κc in
£
1− αβ
1−θ , 1− αβ
¢
, κγc , such that Ψ(ω) < 0 if and
only if κc > κγc . From (52), that implies γ¯d∗ > γ¯n∗, the opposite being true
if κc ≤ κγc
17In the non-congested Glomm-Ravikumar (1994) setup, where κc = 0, lump-sum taxes
would always produce faster growth than income taxes, a special case of our result.
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Corollary 5 κγc is inversely related to α, θ and β.
Proof. Ψ(ω) = 0 defines an implicit function which is {2 on Ω. Let us
denote B = (1− κc)
n
1− θ [(1− κc) (1− θ)]
1−θ
θ
o
> 0. From Proposition
4, ∂Ψ(ω)/∂κc < 0. Consequently, by the implicit function theorem: (a)
∂κγc
∂α = −
∂Ψ(ω)/∂α
∂Ψ(ω)/∂κc < 0, since
∂Ψ(ω)
∂α =
−β
B
< 0; (b) ∂κ
γ
c
∂β = −
∂Ψ(ω)/∂β
∂Ψ(ω)/∂κc <
0, since ∂Ψ(ω)∂β =
−α
B
< 0; and (c)∂κ
γ
c
∂θ = −
∂Ψ(ω)/∂θ
∂Ψ(ω)/∂κc < 0, since
∂Ψ(ω)
∂θ =
αβ[(1−κc)(1−θ)]
1−θ
θ ln[(1−κc)(1−θ)]
(1−κc)θ
½
1−θ[(1−κc)(1−θ)]
1−θ
θ
¾2 , which is negative because ln [(1− κc) (1− θ)] <
0
Since the economy displays no transition, at t = 1 variables are already
on their bgp, growing at the steady-state rate unless any policy or structural
change occurs. Given K0, K
g
0 , (46), (48) and (49) show that state variables
at t = 1 under the growth-maximizing policies satisfy,
Kd∗1 /K
n∗
1 = κd∗i + κc = θ + (1− θ)κc < 1,
Kgd∗1 /K
gn∗
1 = κd∗i /κn∗i =
θ (1− κc)
1− κc − αβ
,
so that the disincentive created by income taxes leads to a private capital
stock below that accumulated under lump-sum taxes. The distortion on pri-
vate capital accumulation decreases for high values of κc, since theKd∗1 /Kn∗1 -
ratio depends positively on κc. On the other hand, Kgd∗1 /K
gn∗
1 increases with
κc and Kgd∗1 > K
gn∗
1 for κc > 1− αβ1−θ (i.e., when κd∗i > κn∗i ). The economy
reacts to taxes on private capital with higher public capital accumulation,
and this shift of resources from private to public capital accumulation can
be enough to produce higher long-run growth.
The Kgd∗1 /K
gn∗
1 -ratio increases with β, α and θ and, additionally, the
Kd∗1 /K
n∗
1 -ratio increases with θ, which explains the result in Corollary 5.
The higher the output elasticities of either type of capital, α, θ, the lower
will be the loss of future resources produced by distortionary taxation, so it
will be more likely that this system produces higher growth.
Growth in this economy arises from the accumulation of both, private
and public capital. A higher preference for future utility increases the de-
sire to save more under non-distortionary taxation since then, the return to
private capital is not taxed. Not leaving many resources for consumption,
the government has a limit on their own productive investment expenditures,
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which restricts the possibilities for future growth. The distortion produced
by public consumption in this model is reflected in the fact that, under lump-
sum taxes, too much private capital is accumulated relative to public capital.
This is negative for long-run growth, which explains the possible superiority
of distortionary taxation.
Theoretical results in Proposition 4 are easy to show because both types
of capital fully depreciate every period. However, full depreciation is not
needed for the qualitative statements in this proposition. Maintaining the
assumption of linear depreciation rates for both types of capital, it is shown
in the Appendix (part 2): (a) there exists a single and well-defined bgp; (b)
the growth-maximizing public investment ratio under income taxes, κd∗i , is
given by (50) for any δ, δg; (c) the result in Proposition 4 remains valid: the
κc-threshold, κγc , for any δg ∈ [0, 1] and δ = 1 is the same as with δg = δ = 1,
while it is higher18 than that value when δ ∈ [0, 1).
4.2 Maximizing welfare
We now extend the analysis to discuss the possibility that the maximum
level of welfare might be higher under income than under lump-sum taxes.
Given κc ≥ 0 and K0, Kg0 > 0, we assume that the government chooses κi
to maximize the welfare of the representative household over the set of π-
CE allocations. Since under full depreciation of both types of capital the
economy displays no transition, the problem reduces to choosing κi such
that,
max
0≤κi≤1
V (C0, γ¯) =
·
1
1− β lnC0 +
β
(1− β)2 ln(1 + γ¯)
¸
, (53)
subject to either (35) and (45) under income taxes or to (41) and (47) under
lump-sum taxes. For 0 < β < 1, V (C0, γ¯) is strictly concave and bounded
and the choice set is convex and compact, so that the optimization problem
(53) has a single solution. Moreover, since lim
κi→0+
V = lim
κi→1−
V = −∞, the
welfare-maximizing level of κi falls strictly inside the interval (0, 1).
In fact, the welfare maximizing levels of κi under income taxes, κd+i , and
18So, for given β,α, θ, the range of κc-values leading to higher growth under income
taxes is smaller when private capital depreciation is not complete. A numerical example
is also provided in table 6.2.1 in the Appendix (part 2), showing that, in fact, κγc varies
very little for δg, δ ∈ [0, 1].
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under lump-sum taxes, κn+i , are given by:19
κd+i = βθ(1− κc) = βκd∗i , (54)
κn+i =
βθ
1− β(1− θ) (1− κc − αβ) =
βθ
1− β(1− θ)κ
n∗
i , (55)
with κd∗i and κn∗i being the growth-maximizing investment ratios defined in
(50) and (51).
Since βθ
1−β(1−θ) < 1, the growth-maximizing public investment/output ra-
tio is strictly higher than the welfare-maximizing ratio under both tax rules,20
the difference between them being larger under the less distorting tax sys-
tem. As in Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), under income taxes, the level of
κd+i differs from κd∗i by the factor β, since public investment only becomes
productive next period, so the representative household discounts the pos-
itive effect of public investment on welfare by β. Under lump-sum taxes,
the discrepancy between κn∗i and κn+i , measured by βθ1−β(1−θ) , is smaller than
β, but it increases with β and θ. The welfare-maximizing productive public
investment ratio is higher under income than under lump-sum taxation for
κc > κ˜c = 1− α1−θ .21
To discuss conditions under which welfare could be higher under income
than under lump-sum taxes, we evaluate (53) under κi = κn+i and under
κi = κd+i , to obtain maximized levels of welfare V n and V d, respectively.
Their difference, D = V n − V d, can be written as22
(1− β)D(ω) = ln
µ
1− β
1− αβ
¶
+
1− β(1− θ)
1− β ln
·
1− κc − αβ
1− β(1− θ)
¸
(56)
− 1
1− β ln (1− κc)−
1− θβ
1− β ln (1− βθ) ,
19See Appendix (part 3). Along the paper, a “ + ” uppercase denotes a value obtained
under a welfare-maximizing public investment strategy.
20κd+i and κd∗i are equal to each other in the no-spillover model of Barro (1990), while
κd+i < κd∗i in Futagami et al. (1993) and in Glomm and Ravikumar (1994).
21Since κd+i > κ
n+
i for κc > 1 − α1−θ , we will have equality between κ
d+
i and κ
n+
i
when κc = 0 and α = 1− θ (i.e., no spillover in the productive process). Precisely under
these conditions, Corsetti and Roubini (1996) show that the welfare-maximizing public
investment ratio is independent of the tax system considered in a standard Barro-type
framework.
22See Appendix (part 3) for more details on this point.
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where D(ω) is defined on Ω.
Even though it is not possible to find explicit conditions implyingD(ω) <
0, for given values of α, β, θ, Proposition 8 guarantees existence of a single
positive threshold κvc for the non-productive investment ratio, above (below)
which taxing the income of productive factors is welfare-superior (-inferior)
to taxing lump-sum. Lemmas 6 and 7 show two intermediate results.
Lemma 6 D (0;α,β, θ) > 0 for any α,β, θ in Ω.
Proof. See Appendix (part 4)
Lemma 7 For any given values α0,β0, θ0 in (0, 1) with α0 + θ0 ≤ 1, the
function h(κc) defined by h(κc) = D(κc,α0,β0, θ0) in (56) is concave, and
has a single maximum at κ˜c = 1− α01−θ0 .
Proof. It is easy to see from (56) that, given α0, β0, θ0 in Ω, h(κc) is
differentiable, the single solution to ∂h/∂κc = ∂D(κc;α0,β0, θ0)/∂κc = 0 is
κ˜c = 1− α01−θ0 , and ∂
2D(κc;α0,β0, θ0)/∂κ2c |κc=κ˜c< 0
Proposition 8 There is a critical value of κc, κvc ∈ (κ˜c, 1 − αβ), so that
income taxes are a preferred alternative to lump-sum taxes from the point of
view of welfare if and only if κc > κvc .
Proof. (a) D(ω), defined by (56) is continuous in Ω; (b) we have seen in
Lemma 6 that D (0;α,β, θ) > 0 for any α,β, θ in Ω, while Lemma 7 shows
that κ˜c = argmaxD (κc;α,β, θ), so that D (κ˜c;α,β, θ) > 0; (c) at the highest
feasible value of κc, lim
κc→(1−αβ)−
D(ω) = −∞. Therefore, there exists a single
and well-defined threshold for κc, κvc ∈ (κ˜c, 1− αβ), such that D(ω) < 0 for
any κc > κvc
Corollary 9 shows that κvc declines with α, the output elasticity of private
capital. We also show that there is a threshold θ∗, such that κvc declines
with the output elasticity of public capital θ, provided θ > θ∗. For standard
parameterizations, the implied value of θ∗ is low enough so that we can
safely consider ∂κvc/∂θ < 0. Finally, a numerical exploration shows that κvc
declines with β when this parameter is close to one, as considered in standard
calibrations. This should be expected, since (53) shows that as β approaches
1, maximizing long-run growth and maximizing welfare become equivalent.
These results suggest that, as it was the case when comparing growth, high
levels of β, α and θ increase the likelihood that taxing total income could be
a welfare-superior alternative to taxing lump-sum.
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Corollary 9 κvc is inversely related to α, while ∂κvc/∂θ < 0 for θ ∈ (max {0, θ∗} , 1−
α], with θ∗ = − κc−β(1−α)β(2−κc−αβ) , and ∂κ
v
c/∂θ > 0 otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix (part 5)
Corollary 10 shows that κd+i needs to be bigger than κn+i for the maxi-
mum level of welfare to be higher under income than under lump-sum taxes,
which is a condition similar to that found when comparing growth rates.
Corollary 10 A necessary condition for maximum welfare to be larger un-
der income than under lump-sum taxes is that the welfare-maximizing public
investment ratio be higher under income than under lump-sum taxes.
Proof. Let us assume that maximum welfare is larger under income than
under lump-sum taxes. Then, by Proposition 8, κc > κvc . But κvc > κ˜c, so
that κc > κ˜c, which implies, from (54) and (55), κd+i > κn+i
Lack of transitional dynamics allows us to write welfare as in (53), a com-
bination of initial consumption and long-term growth. In fact, in choosing
one versus the other tax system, we are trading-off current versus future
consumption. Taxing income from productive factors disincentives private
capital accumulation and reduces long-run growth, with a moderate imme-
diate consumption sacrifice. Alternatively, lump-sum taxation produces an
important consumption sacrifice initially, to the possible benefit of higher
long-term growth. From (45), (47), we have, under the welfare-maximizing
public investment ratios,
Cd+0
Cn+0
=
(1− αβ) (1− κc) (1− βθ)
(1− β) (1− κc − αβ)
[1− β (1− θ)] . (57)
So far, we have analyzed the optimal choice for public investment under each
of the two alternative tax systems, to then characterize optimal consumer
decisions for each combination formed by a tax system and the associated
optimal investment ratio. Condition (57) shows that initial consumption
along the optimal path is in this economy always larger under income taxes
than under lump-sum taxes.23 Moreover, that difference increases with κc.
On the other hand, for small levels of the public consumption ratio κc,
growth is higher under non-distortionary taxes and there are two competing
23Which is easy to see when κc = 0. Since the ratio of initial consumptions is increasing
in κc, the general result follows.
22
effects in (53). As we saw in the previous section, it is when κc increases
that growth may become higher under distortionary taxation. Hence, any
condition favoring higher growth under income taxes will also tend to induce
that distortionary taxation might be preferred from the point of view of
welfare. In fact, if growth ever gets higher under distortionary taxation, it
is clear from (53) that this type of taxes will also be preferred in terms of
welfare.
In particular, we have already seen that higher output elasticities of either
type of capital attenuate the negative effects of the disincentive to accumu-
late capital, making more likely that long-run growth may be higher under
distortionary than under non-distortionary taxation. It is therefore not sur-
prising that they also favor that maximum welfare may be higher under
distortionary taxation. Finally, maximizing welfare amounts to maximizing
long-run growth for high values of β, so that an increase in the value of β
inside that range increases the likelihood that distortionary taxation may
lead to a higher level of welfare.
4.3 A numerical illustration
We now illustrate the main findings from the previous sections with a sim-
ple numerical example. Specifically, for alternative calibrations (i.e., spe-
cific values for β, α and θ), we find the solutions to D(κc;β,α, θ) = 0 and
Ψ(κc; β,α, θ) = 0. Assuming annual data, four alternative parameterizations
(bench1, bench2, bench3 and bench4) are considered in table 4.1, all of them
sharing a value β = 0.99. In bench1, we assume a standard parametrization:
α = 0.4, θ = 0.15 so that φ = 1−α−θ = 0.45. Relative to bench1, bench2 is
a small variation, with α = 0.75. This parameterization agrees with a broad
interpretation of aggregate capital in the private producing process, Kt that
would include human and physical capital [see Romer (1987)]. In bench3 we
consider the possibility of a technology intensive in productive public capital
by setting θ = 0.35 [close to the value estimated in Aschauer (1989)], and
α = 0.4, as in bench1. Finally, bench4 assumes a high productive technology
in both types of capital, with α = 0.7 and θ = 0.3, implying absence of
spillover effects.
For each parameterization considered in table 4.1, table 4.2 shows numer-
ical values for: (i) the two thresholds: κγc and κvc , the zeroes to Ψ(ω) and
D (ω), (ii) for κc = κγc , the growth-maximizing public investment/output
ratio under income taxes [κd∗i from (50)] and the level of κn∗i under lump-
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sum taxes (51), and (iii) for κc = κvc , the welfare-maximizing public invest-
ment/output ratios under income taxes [κd+i in (54)] and under lump-sum
taxes [κn+i from (55)].
As expected, both thresholds decrease when we increase α or θ , although
it seems that changes in the elasticity of private capital are more relevant. For
instance, from bench1, the level of κγc decreases from 60.4% to 59.2% when
θ increases from .15 to .35, but it falls down to 24.9% when α is increased
from .40 to .75. A similar observation applies to κvc . The threshold above
which growth is higher under distortionary taxation is always higher than
the one above which distortionary taxation leads to higher welfare, so the
latter situation arises more often, as we pointed out in the previous section.
Productive public investment ratios maximizing either growth or welfare
under lump-sum taxes are well below those obtained under distortionary tax-
ation. Finally, under either tax system, investment ratios maximizing wel-
fare are very close to those maximizing long-run growth. Under distortionary
taxation, the κi-ratio maximizing welfare is always below that maximizing
growth, the opposite result arising under lump-sum taxes. This is again due
to the fact that initial consumption is higher under distortionary taxation.
The presence of the spillover externality allows us to change the values of
the output elasticities of private and public capital, α and θ, independently
from each other, but that externality plays a minor role in the model. In
fact, the proofs to all results in the previous section remain valid for the case
φ = 0, so long as we maintain the restriction α+ θ = 1.
5 Conclusions
The superiority of non-distorting versus distorting taxation in endogenous
growth economies has been challenged from different perspectives. In par-
ticular, it is already well known that positive taxation on the income of
productive factors may be growth and welfare enhancing when it corrects a
negative externality in the competitive equilibrium allocation.
Along this line, we have shown that the presence of a significant level
of wasteful public expenditures is a sufficient condition for income taxes
to lead to higher long-run growth and welfare than under lump-sum taxes.
Specifically, we have characterized a threshold for the unproductive public
expenditure/output ratio, above (below) which taxing productive factors’
income results in a welfare-superior (inferior) financing alternative to taxing
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lump-sum. The higher the output elasticities of public and private capital,
the lower the value of this threshold, favoring income taxes to be preferred
to lump-sum taxes for steady-state growth and welfare.
A given ratio of public consumption to output plays the role of a negative
externality, which is more damaging under non-distortionary taxation. In
that case, accumulation of private capital is stronger because the return on
capital is not being taxed. As a consequence, less resources are left for public
investment, which limits the scope for future growth. A higher time discount
factor increases the desire to accumulate capital, intensifying the effect of this
externality and making more likely that distortionary taxes may be preferred
to lump-sum taxes.
The more controversial assumption in our model is the existence of an
exogenous path of public consumption that needs to be financed every period.
Even though a first-best solution would set the level of this variable to zero
every period, the reality is that it is significantly different from zero in actual
economies, its ratio to GDP being rather stable over time in most cases.
From a theoretical point of view, several assumptions could be made to justify
a positive level of Cgt /Yt. The simplest and more standard choice is to assume
that Cgt affects welfare in such a way that the marginal utility of public
consumption becomes infinity when Cgt = 0 [for instance, considering a utility
function U(Ct, G
g
t ) = lnCt + ϕ lnC
g
t , with ϕ > 0]. Another possibility,
more in line with our setup, is to consider that a minimum level of wasteful
expenditures is required for the public sector to exist. Deviations above this
minimum level, as explained by high administrative and bureaucratic costs,
high levels of outstanding debt, existence of corruption costs, etc., would then
characterize less efficient governments. We could then consider the minimum
level of wasteful expenditures required to be endogenous to the government,
investment in infrastructure or in learning government skills allowing for a
reduction in this requirement on expenditures.
Welfare analysis has been relatively easy to make under the assumption
that both types of capital fully depreciate every period. This assumption
allows us to solve for the competitive equilibrium analytically, although in a
framework too simple to establish strong policy recommendations. Regard-
ing long-run growth, we have shown that full depreciation is not determinant
for the qualitative and quantitative conclusions, since the analysis is of the
steady-state type. Less than full depreciation in public and private capital
would alter the model significantly, since the steady-state would no longer be
reached in just one period. Welfare analysis then requires a full characteriza-
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tion of the transitional dynamics, which can only be done through numerical
solution methods. That would be an interesting extension of this paper.
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6 Appendix:
6.1 Part 1: Existence, uniqueness of equilibrium, and
absence of transitional dynamics
Our proof proceeds in a similar way to Glomm and Ravikumar (1994, 1999):
i) formulate an artificial planning problem; ii) show the equivalence be-
tween that planning problem and the π-competitive equilibrium allocation;
iii) show existence and uniqueness of a solution to the artificial planning
problem; iv) show that a linear solution to the artificial planning problem
exists; v) hence, conclude that the time path given by the linear solution is
the single π-competitive equilibrium allocation. Once the linear solution to
the π-competitive equilibrium allocation has been found, absence of transi-
tional dynamics is already shown in the paper.
In our model, the second welfare theorem does not apply due to the
distortions introduced by public capital and distortionary taxes. However,
as in Glomm and Ravikumar (1994, 1999), we can formulate an artificial
planning problem [P], whose solution can be shown to be a π-CE,
Max
{Ct,Kt+1}∞t=0
∞X
t=0
βt ln(Ct), (58)
subject to
Ct + C
g
t +Kt+1 = (1− τ t)AL1−αt K
(α+φ+θ)
t
µ
Kgt
Kt
¶θ
(59)
under distorting taxes or,
Ct + C
g
t +Kt+1 +Xt = AL
1−α
t K
(α+φ+θ)
t
µ
Kgt
Kt
¶θ
(60)
under lump-sum taxes, givenK0,K
g
0 and a fiscal policy π ≡ {Igt , Cgt , τ t,Xt}∞t=0
at both cases.
For each possible π, we define the feasibility set:
Ξπd ≡ [{Ct,Kt+1}∞t=0 : Ct,Kt+1 ≥ 0;Ct + Cgt +Kt+1 ≤ (1− τ t)Yt;K0,Kg0 > 0] ,
(61)
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under distorting taxes and
Ξπn ≡ [{Ct, Kt+1}∞t=0 : Ct, Kt+1 ≥ 0;Ct + Cgt +Kt+1 +Xt ≤ Yt;K0,Kg0 > 0] ,
(62)
under non-distorting taxes. These are the π-feasible allocation sets under
each tax system.
Proposition 11 . Equivalence: Given K0 and K
g
0 and a fiscal policy π,
the allocation {Ct,Kt+1}∞t=0 solves problem [P] if and only if it is part of a
π-competitive equilibrium allocation.
Proof. Since the private sector is not allowed to borrow or lend and the
production function shows constant return to scale (i.e., profits are zero),
it is straightforward to see the equivalence between the optimally conditions
for problem [P] and conditions characterizing the π-competitive equilibrium
[Proposition 1 in Section 3 in Glomm and Ravikumar (1994)]
Proposition 12 . Existence and Uniqueness: Given K0 and K
g
0 and
a fiscal policy π, there exists a unique sequence {Ct, Kt+1}∞t=0 that solves
problem [P].
Proof. Our proof of existence proceeds in three steps.
i) from (10), the sequence {Kgt }∞t=0 is bounded above by µtKg0 , with µ =
1 + γ¯. As a consequence,
P∞
t=0 β
t ln(Ct) is bounded above for all feasible
consumption paths. To prove that, feasibility implies:
Ct ≤ Yt ≤ AK(α+φ)t (Kgt )
θ ≤ AK(α+φ)t
¡
µtKg0
¢θ
,
Kt+1 ≤ Yt ≤ AK(α+φ)t (Kgt )
θ ≤ AK(α+φ)t
¡
µtKg0
¢θ
.
We define Ht = A (µtK
g
0)
θ. From the second inequality it follows that:
Kt+1 ≤ max
n
H
1/(1−α−φ)
t ,Kt
o
, for all t,
since α + φ ∈ (0, 1). That condition means that the growth rate of Kt is
bounded above by the growth rate of H1/(1−α−φ)t , that is
Kt ≤ K0µtθ/(1−α−φ) for all t.
Therefore,
∞X
t=0
βt ln(Ct) ≤ ln
£
A(Kg0 )
θ¤ ∞X
t=0
βt + θ ln(µ)
∞X
t=0
tβt + (α+ φ)
∞X
t=0
βt lnKt.
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The first two terms at the right hand side are clearly finite and the third is
also bounded above because
∞X
t=0
βt lnKt ≤ ln(K0)
∞X
t=0
βt +
θ
(1− α− φ) ln(µ)
∞X
t=0
tβt
is finite.
ii) by the Lebesgue Dominated Convergence theorem, the objective func-
tion in problem [P] is continuous on the set of π-feasible allocations.
iii) by Tychonoff’s theorem, the feasibility sets Ξπd and Ξπn are compact.
Thus, from i)-iii) we can apply the maximum principle, which ensures the
existence of at least one solution to problem [P].
Uniqueness follows from concavity of the utility function together with the
convexity of Ξπd and Ξπn
Proposition 13 The sequence
©
Cdt , K
d
t+1
ª∞
t=0
given by the linear system (45)
and (46) is a π-competitive equilibrium allocation under distorting taxes.
Proof. In competitive equilibrium Ct, Kt+1 and K
g
t+1 must be strictly
greater than zero. We make a guess that Ct and Kt+1 are linear on current
output: Ct = aYt and Kt+1 = bYt. Combining these guesses with (17) and
(3)
ab1−θκθi Yt
aYt
= β (1− τ t+1)αA
µ
κiYt
bYt
¶θ
, (63)
where we have considered that, from (2),
Yt+1 = AK
1−θ
t+1
¡
Kgt+1
¢θ
= Ab1−θκθi Yt, (64)
since α+ θ + φ = 1. Manipulating (63),
b1−θκθi = β (1− τ t+1)α
³κi
b
´θ
⇔ b = αβ (1− τ t+1) . (65)
Finally, combining the previous guesses with (21) and the fact that Igt = κiYt
and Cgt = κcYt, we get
Yt (b+ a+ κi + κc) = Yt ⇔ a = (1− κi − κc)− αβ (1− τ t+1) . (66)
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Proposition 14 The sequence
©
Cnt , K
n
t+1
ª∞
t=0
given by the linear system (47)
and (48) is a π-competitive equilibrium allocation under non-distorting taxes.
Proof. The proof is equivalent to the previous one but using the equilibrium
conditions under non-distorting taxes
Finally, from the Equivalence Proposition 11 above, we conclude that the
sequence {Ct,Kt+1}∞t=0, given by the linear systems in Propositions 13 and
14, is the unique π-competitive equilibrium allocation under each alternative
tax system.
6.2 Part 2: Partial depreciation of capital stocks
Conditions (29) and (32) can be jointly written,
γ¯ = β [(1− δ) + (1− τ¯)r¯]− 1, (67)
with τ¯ = 0 under lump-sum taxes and τ¯ = κi + κc under income taxes.
Using this together with (22)-(25), which are valid under either tax sys-
tem, we get,
Φ
¡
k¯g
¢
= A
¡
k¯g
¢θ−1 ¡κi − βα(1− τ¯)k¯g¢+ 1− δg − β(1− δ) = 0, (68)
whose positive roots are potential candidates to be steady-state values of k¯g.
Since Φ
¡
k¯g
¢
is continuous and decreasing in k¯g, with lim
k¯g→0+
Φ
¡
k¯g
¢
= +∞
and lim
k¯g→+∞
Φ
¡
k¯g
¢
= −∞, there exists a single k¯g > 0 such that Φ
¡
k¯g
¢
= 0,
which defines the steady-state of the economy.
Lemma 15 Under either tax system, the steady-state level of k¯g is directly
related to the productive public investment ratio κi.
Proof. Applying the implicit function theorem to the {2-mapping Φ(·) and
using the fact that under income taxes τ¯ = κi + κc, we get,
∂k¯gd
∂κi
= −
∂Φ
¡
k¯gd
¢
/∂κi
∂Φ
¡
k¯gd
¢
/∂k¯gd
=
1 + βαk¯gd
(1− θ) 1
k¯gd
κi + αβθ(1− κi − κc)
> 0, (69)
while under lump-sum taxes,
∂k¯gn
∂κi
= −
∂Φ
¡
k¯gn
¢
/∂κi
∂Φ
¡
k¯gn
¢
/∂k¯gn
=
1
(1− θ) 1
k¯gn
κi + αβθ
> 0. (70)
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Lemma 16 Under income taxes, the growth-maximizing ratio is κd∗i = θ(1−
κc) for any δ, δg ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. From (23) and (22) we get: lim
κi→0
γ¯ = −δg < 0 and lim
κi→1−
γ¯ =
−κcA
¡
k¯gd
¢θ − c¯ − δ < 0, so that positive values of γ¯ can be attained only
for values of κd∗i in the open interval (0, 1). Taking derivatives in (23) and
combining
∂γ¯
∂κi
= A
¡
k¯gd
¢θ−2µ
k¯gd − κi(1− θ)
∂k¯gd
∂κi
¶
= 0, (71)
with (69) implies κd∗i = θ(1− κc) for any δ and δg
The qualitative result in Proposition 4 holds for δg < 1. The κγc -threshold
is the same as that characterized in the proposition, so long as δ = 1. If δ < 1,
the κγc -threshold is higher than that in Proposition 4.
Lemma 17 There is a critical value of κc, κˆγc , above (below) which the
maximum achievable growth rate is higher (lower) under income than under
lump-sum taxes. For any δg ∈ [0, 1] and δ = 1, this κc-threshold is the same
as with δg = δ = 1, while it is higher than that value when δ ∈ [0, 1).
Proof. Since the growth rate under lump-sum taxes is increasing in κi for
any δg, δ ∈ [0, 1], the highest feasible growth rate that can be achieved under
lump-sum taxes is again obtained for a productive investment ratio of κn∗i ,
the level of κi implying c¯n = 0. Let us denote by κˆγc the κc-threshold above
which the maximum growth rate under income taxes becomes higher than
growth under κn∗i , and by k¯gd∗, k¯gn∗, the steady-state values of the K¯
g
t /K¯t ratio
obtained under κd∗i ,κn∗i , the growth maximizing investment policies under
income and lump-sum taxes, respectively, when κc = κˆγc
Thus, by definition, κˆγc , κn∗i , k¯gd∗ and k¯gn∗ must verify: (1) Φ(k¯gd∗) = 0
under income taxes for κi = κd∗i , (2) Φ(k¯gn∗) = 0 under lump-sum taxes
for κi = κn∗i , (3) c¯n = 0 under lump-sum taxes for κi = κn∗i , and (4) for
κc = κˆγc , the growth rate obtained under κd∗i , must be equal to the upper
bound on growth rates under lump-sum taxes, i.e., the growth rate that
would be obtained under κn∗i .
These conditions reduce to:
A
¡
k¯gd∗
¢θ−1
(1− κˆγc )
£
θ − βα(1− θ)k¯gd∗
¤
+ 1− δg − β(1− δ) = 0, (72)
A
¡
k¯gn∗
¢θ−1 ¡κn∗i − βαk¯gn∗¢+ 1− δg − β(1− δ) = 0, (73)
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(1− κn∗i − κˆγc )A
¡
k¯gn∗
¢θ − κn∗i A ¡k¯gn∗¢θ−1 − δ + δg = 0, (74)
κn∗i = θ (1− κˆγc )
µ
k¯gn∗
k¯gd∗
¶1−θ
. (75)
Subtracting (72) from (73) and combining with (74),
k¯gn∗
k¯gd∗
= [(1− θ) (1− κˆγc )]
1/θ . (76)
Plugging (76) into (75),
κn∗i = θ (1− θ)
1−θ
θ (1− κˆγc )
1
θ . (77)
On the other hand, adding up (73) and (74),
A
¡
k¯gn∗
¢θ
(1− κn∗i − κˆγc − βα) + (1− β) (1− δ) = 0. (78)
If δ = 1 then, for any δg ∈ [0, 1], we have from (78): κn∗i = 1 − κˆγc − βα,
since k¯gn∗ > 0, and plugging (77) into this relationship, we obtain,
κˆγc − 1 +
βα
1− θ [(1− κˆγc ) (1− θ)]
1−θ
θ
= 0, (79)
which has the same roots as the Ψ-function defined in (52). Consequently,
κˆγc = κγc , the same value obtained under full depreciation of both types of
capital. Alternatively, if δ ∈ [0, 1) we would have (1− β) (1− δ) > 0 in (78),
which implies that, for any δg ∈ [0, 1], we have κni > 1− κˆγc −βα, and hence
κˆγc > κγc
Even though the κγc -threshold changes with the depreciation rate of pri-
vate capital, this effect is minor. Table 6.2 summarizes a numerical example
for θ = .15, α = .75 and β = .99. System (72)-(75) is solved for this calibra-
tion to obtain κˆγc , which turns out to vary just between 24.9% and 25.5% for
δg, δk ∈ [0, 1].
6.3 Part 3: The welfare-maximizing public investment
ratio
Proof. Under income taxes: plugging (45) and (35) into (53), we get the
optimization problem,
max
0≤κi≤1
1
1− β
µ
ln [(1− κi − κc) (1− αβ)]+
+ β
(1−β)θ [lnκi + (1− θ) ln (1− κi − κc)] +∆
¶
, (80)
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where ∆ = β
1−β lnA +
β
1−β (1 − θ) ln (αβ) + ln
³
A (Kg0 )
θK1−θ0
´
. Hence, the
welfare-maximizing ratio, κd+i , is the solution to,
−1
1− κd+i − κc
+
β
1− β
µ
θ
κd+i
− (1− θ) 1
1− κd+i − κc
¶
= 0, (81)
leading to: κd+i = βθ(1− κc).
In a similar way, under lump-sum taxes: plugging (47) and (41) into (53),
max
0≤κi≤1
1
1− β
µ
ln [(1− κi − κc)− αβ] +
β
(1− β)θ lnκi +∆
¶
, (82)
and the welfare-maximizing ratio, κn+i , the solution to
−1
1− κn+i − κc − αβ
+
β
1− βθ
1
κn+i
= 0 (83)
is: κn+i = βθ1−β(1−θ) (1− κc − αβ).
Given Kg0 , K0 > 0 as initial conditions, to obtain a closed form for the
welfare function under income taxes, we evaluate (53) under κi = κd+i and
τ¯ = κc + κd+i , obtaining V d:
V d =
·
1
1− β lnC
d+
0 +
β
(1− β)2 ln(1 + γ¯
d+)
¸
, with
Cd+0 = (1− κc) (1− βθ) (1− αβ)Y0, (84)
1 + γ¯d+ = A (1− κc) (βθ)θ [αβ (1− βθ)]1−θ , (85)
so that,
(1− β)V d = ln (1− κc) + ln (1− βθ) + ln (1− αβ) + lnY0 + (86)
+
β
(1− β)
½
lnA+ ln (1− κc) + θ ln(βθ)+
+ (1− θ) [ln (αβ) + ln (1− βθ)]
¾
.
Under lump-sum taxes, we evaluate (53) under κi = κn+i and τ¯ = 0,
obtaining V n:
V n =
·
1
1− β lnC
n+
0 +
β
(1− β)2 ln(1 + γ¯
n+)
¸
, with
Cn+0 =
(1− β) (1− κc − αβ)
1− β(1− θ) Y0, (87)
1 + γ¯n+ = A
·
βθ
1− β(1− θ) (1− κc − αβ)
¸θ
(αβ)1−θ , (88)
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so that,
(1− β)V n = ln(1− β) + ln (1− κc − αβ)− ln (1− β(1− θ)) + lnY0 + (89)
+
β
(1− β)
½
lnA+ θ [ln(βθ) + ln (1− κc − αβ)− ln (1− β(1− θ))]+
+ (1− θ) ln (αβ)
¾
.
Finally, from (86) and (89), it is easy to show that (1− β)
¡
V n − V d
¢
is given
by (56)
6.4 Part 4: Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. From (56), we have ∂D(0;α,β,θ)∂α = −β
θβ
(1−αβ)(1−β) < 0 at κc =
0. It suffices to show that for the highest feasible value of α, α = 1 − θ,
D(0; 1 − θ,β, θ) = ln
³
1−β
1−(1−θ)β
´
− 1−θβ
1−β ln (1− βθ) > 0, to conclude that
D (0;α, β, θ) > 0 for any α, β, θ in Ω.
To show that D(0; 1− θ,β, θ) > 0, let us denote by
f(θ; β) = ln (1− β)− ln [1− β (1− θ)] ; g(θ;β) = 1− βθ
1− β ln (1− θβ) .
We want to show that w(θ;β) ≡ f(θ; β)− g(θ; β) > 0.
Second derivatives are:
∂2f
∂θ2
=
β2
[1− β (1− θ)]2
;
∂2g
∂θ2
=
β2
(1− β) (1− βθ) ,
so that
∂2w
∂θ2
= β2
(1− β) (1− βθ)− [1− β (1− θ)]2
[1− β (1− θ)]2 (1− β) (1− βθ)
.
Since 0 < β < 1 and 0 < θ < 1, we have:
sgn
µ
∂2w
∂θ2
¶
= sgn
£
(1− β) (1− βθ)− [1− β (1− θ)]2
¤
=
= sgn
£
−βθ2 − 3 (1− β) θ + (1− β)
¤
.
Let us denote: ϕ (θ;β) = βθ2 + 3 (1− β) θ − (1− β), a second degree poly-
nomial in θ for each given β, with ϕ (0;β) < 0,ϕ (1; β) > 0. Its two roots are
given by:
θβ =
−3 (1− β)±
q
9 (1− β)2 + 4β (1− β)
2β
,
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where it is clear that θ−β < 0, while it is not hard to show that θ
+
β < 1.
Hence, in the range of feasible values of θ, the [0,1]-interval, the ϕ (θ;β)
polynomial moves from negative to positive, crossing the θ-axis just once.
Equivalently, w (θ; β) is convex between θ = 0 and the positive root, θ = θ+β ,
and concave to the right of that point, being differentiable on [0, 1]. Together
with w (0;β) = 0, w (1; β) = 0, w0 (0; β) = 0 and w0 (1;β) < 0, all these
conditions imply that w (θ;β) reaches a single local maximum between θ+β
and θ = 1, taking always positive values on the interval [0, 1]
6.5 Part 5: Proof of Corollary 9
Proof. D(ω) in (56) defines an implicit function in ω. Since D(ω) ∈ {2 on
its domain, Ω, the implicit function theorem applies. In addition, we know
from Lemma 7 that ∂D(ω)/∂κc < 0 for κc ≥ κvc . Hence:
(a) ∂κvc/∂α = −
∂D(ω)/∂α
∂D(ω)/∂κc
< 0, since
∂D(ω)
∂α
= −β κc(1− β) + βθ(1− βα)
(1− αβ) (1− β) (1− κc − αβ)
< 0,
(b) ∂κvc/∂θ = −
∂D(ω)/∂θ
∂D(ω)/∂κc
, with
∂D(ω)/∂θ =
β
1− β ln
·
(1− κc − αβ) (1− βθ)
1− β(1− θ)
¸
.
Let us consider the function h(θ;β,κc,α) = (1−κc−αβ)(1−βθ)1−β(1−θ) − 1. It is easy
to verify that: (i) ∂h(·)/∂θ = (1− κc − αβ)β −2+β(1−β(1−θ))2 < 0 ∀θ, since κc <
1 − αβ and (ii) h(·) has a single root at θ∗ = − κc−β(1−α)β(2−κc−αβ) < 1 − α, which
shows the statement of the corollary
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Table 4.1: Alternative benchmark calibrations
bench1 bench2 bench3 bench4
β 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
α 0.40 0.75 0.40 0.70
θ 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.30
φ 0.45 0.10 0.25 0.00
Table 4.2: κc-thresholds under growth and welfare-maximizing policies
bench1 bench2 bench3 bench4
κγc 60.4 24.9 59.2 25.9
κd∗i 5.9 11.3 14.3 22.2
κn∗i 0.0 0.9 1.2 4.8
κvc 60.3 24.3 58.8 24.5
κd+i 5.9 11.2 14.2 22.4
κn+i 0.1 1.4 1.6 6.0
Note: For values of κc above κγc (κvc ), the maximum long-run growth rate
(welfare) is higher under income than under lump-sum taxes. κd∗i and κd+i
are the productive public investment-to-output ratios maximizing growth
and welfare, respectively, under income taxes and for κc = κγc . κn∗i is the
supremum of the public investment ratio under lump-sum taxes for κc = κvc .
Growth is monotonic on κi in that case. κn+i is the value of the ratio maxi-
mizing welfare under lump-sum taxes.
Table 6.2: κˆγc (%) under alternative δg, δ ∈ [0, 1]
δg\δ 0 .20 .40 .60 .80 1
0 25.48 25.32 25.20 25.09 24.90 24.90
.20 25.50 25.35 25.20 25.10 25.00 24.90
.40 25.50 25.36 25.21 25.10 25.00 24.90
.60 25.51 25.37 25.22 25.10 25.00 24.90
.80 25.52 25.38 25.24 25.10 25.01 24.90
1 25.53 25.39 25.30 25.10 25.01 24.90
39
Fig. 4.1: Growth-maximizing policies under lump-sum and income taxes
γ
feasible growth
rates under
lump-sum
growth under
lump-sum taxes
growth under
income taxes
*n
ix ix
*d
ix
Feasible xi values under
lump-sum taxes
*dγ
A
Note: κd∗i maximizes γ¯ under income taxes and κn∗i is such that c¯ = 0
under lump-sum taxes. If κn∗i is located to the left of A, a higher
growth rate could be achieved under income than under lump-sum
taxes.
40
